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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. , section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court was correct in concluding that relief 
under Rule 60(b)(4) should be denied because a judgment based on personal 
service of process by a constable on an authorized agent is a valid judgment. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion as to the factual 
question whether service occurred. Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555, 557 
(Utah 1983); correction of error as to the legal question whether the service 
that occurred was legally sufficient. Bonneville Billing v. Whatlev, 949 P.2d 
768, 771 (Utah App. 1997). The issues were raised in the court below and 
preserved for appeal. (R. at 105, 203-206). 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) should be denied because the Insurance Company 
failed to satisfy any of the necessary prerequisites to relief under Rule 
60(b)(6). 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Laub v. South Central 
Utah Telephone Association, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982). The issues 
were raised in the court below and preserved for appeal. (R. at 106, 208-
1 
211). 
3. Whether the district court was correct in refusing to examine the 
merits of the underlying judgment, in the context of a motion for relief from 
judgment in which the movant failed to establish a basis for relief under Rule 
60(b). 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Board of Education of 
Granite School District v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1963). This issue 
was raised in the court below and preserved for appeal. (R. at 107-108, 
211-212). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Copies of U.R.C.P., Rule 60(b) (prior version) and Rule 60(b) (as 
amended) are included in the Addendum attached to the Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action against three insurance companies for refund of 
premiums, and against individual agents for fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty 
and negligence. (R. at 1-15) Plaintiff/Appellee Classic Cabinets, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Classic") resolved its claims against the other two insurance 
companies by settlement, dismissing its claims against them wi th prejudice. 
(R. at 67-68, 71-72, 83-84, and 87-88). 
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Classic resolved its claims against Defendant/Appellant All American 
Life Insurance Company (hereinafter the "Insurance Company") by obtaining 
a default judgment against the Insurance Company on February 27, 1996. 
(R. at 41-42). The Insurance Company waited more than 17 months before 
fi l ing, on September 8, 1997, a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
Against All American Life Insurance Company (hereinafter the "Motion for 
Relief"). (R. at 98-100). The motion was denied by the Honorable Frank B. 
Noel, Third District Court, on November 17, 1997. (R. at 229-231). On 
December 16, 1997, the Insurance Company filed its Notice of Appeal from 
Judge Noel's order. (R. at 232-233). 
Statement of Relevant Facts: 
1. The Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation doing business in 
the State of Utah. (Aff. of J.W. Dewbre, par. 2, R. at 112). 
2. CT Corporation System (hereinafter the "Registered Agent") is the 
registered agent for the Insurance Company in the State of Utah, (Aff. of 
Sandy Streeper, par. 3, R. at 143), and has been since at least 1990. (Aff. 
of Chris L. Schmutz, par. 12, R. at 178, 193). 
3. On January 16, 1996, Classic filed the Complaint initiating the 
above-captioned action as Civil No. 960900355 CV, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah (hereinafter the "Lawsuit") . 
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(R. at 1-15). 
4. Also on January 16, 1996, Classic's attorney issued a summons 
directed specifically to the Insurance Company, and delivered that summons 
to Salt Lake County Constable Silvan D. Warnick (hereinafter the 
"Constable") for service. (Aff. of Chris L. Schmutz, par. 7, R. at 177). 
5. The Constable was familiar wi th the Registered Agent and wi th its 
employees who accept service, having frequently and regularly served 
process there over a ten-year period. (Affidavit of Silvan D. Warnick 
(hereinafter "Aff. of Constable", or "Constable's Aff idavit"), par. 6, 8, R. at 
165). 
6. On January 18, 1996, the Constable personally served summons 
and complaint in the Lawsuit on the Registered Agent. (|dL, par. 10, R. at 
166). 
7. The summons was delivered to the Registered Agent at its office on 
50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. at 171), where it was handed 
by the Constable to Michelle Rehrman, an employee of the Registered Agent 
wi th whom the Constable was acquainted by name and face. (Aff. of 
Constable, par. 9, 1 1 , R. at 165-166). 
8. The summons bore the caption of the Lawsuit and was specifically 
addressed to the Insurance Company in the following words: "THE STATE 
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OF UTAH TO ALL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY dba US LIFE." 
(\±, par. 10, R. at 166, 169). 
9. The Constable's practice is to stamp the summons and fill in the 
date and time of service in the stamp on the copy of the summons left wi th 
the defendant; in the stamp on the return copy, the Constable writes the 
name of the person served. (Id., par. 12, R. at 166). 
10. Consistent wi th this practice, the Constable at the time of service 
on January 18, 1996, wrote "Michelle Rehrman" on the return copy of the 
Insurance Company's summons. (Id., R. at 166, 169). 
1 1 . On the same day, the Constable prepared his Affidavit of Service, 
which he signed under oath, and to which he attached the return copy of the 
Insurance Company's summons (the return copy of the summons and 
attached Affidavit of Service are referred to hereinafter as the "Constable's 
Return" or the "Return"). (\±, par. 14, R. at 167, 171). 
12. On January 24, 1996, the Constable's Return was filed wi th the 
Court. (R. at 22-24). 
13. On February 27, 1996, some forty (40) days after the Constable's 
service of the summons and complaint on the Registered Agent for the 
Insurance Company, the Default of the Insurance Company was entered 
pursuant to law by the Clerk of the Court. (R. at 33). 
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14. Following the entry of Default by the Clerk of the Court on 
February 27, 1996, Default Judgment was properly entered by the Court in 
favor of Plaintiff Classic Cabinets, Inc., and against Defendant Insurance 
Company, in the amount of $77,522.12, plus pre-judgment interest in the 
amount of $13,566.42, together with attorneys fees and costs in the 
amount of $1,131.00, for a total judgment of $92,219.54 (hereinafter the 
"Judgment"). (R. at 41-42). 
1 5. On March 1 1 , 1 9 9 6 , Notice of Entry of Default Judgment 
(hereinafter the "Notice"), including a copy of the actual Judgment, was 
served by mail upon the Registered Agent. (Aff. of Schmutz, par. 9, R. at 
177, 183-186). 
16. The Notice informed the Registered Agent as fol lows: "PLEASE 
TAKE NOTICE that Default Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff Classic 
Cabinets, Inc., and against Defendant All American Life Insurance Company 
dba US Life, on February 27, 1996. A copy of the Default Judgment is 
attached hereto." (R. at 43-46, emphasis added). 
17. On March 15, 1996, the Registered Agent acknowledged that it 
had received the Notice on March 13, 1996. (Aff. of Sandy Streeper, par. 
10, R. at 144; Aff. of Schmutz, par. 10, R. at 177-178). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Insurance Company's Registered Agent was properly served, first 
wi th summons and complaint, and later wi th a Notice of Entry of Default 
Judgment. Because service was proper, the Default Judgment obtained by 
Classic against the Insurance Company was valid and enforceable. When 
the Insurance Company waited more than 17 months before filing a motion 
under Rule 60(b) for relief from the Judgment, the motion was too late. The 
district court properly exercised its discretion in accepting as true the facts 
set forth in the Constable's Affidavit and Return, correctly concluded as a 
matter of law that the Judgment was valid, and properly denied the Motion 
for Relief filed by the Insurance Company. The district court's Order Denying 
All American's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARDS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
UNDER RULE 60(b) VARY, DEPENDING 
ON THE SUBSECTION AT ISSUE 
Motions for relief from judgment in Utah are governed by Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There are 6 subsections of the rule, each 
defining a category of situations in which relief from judgment may, under 
appropriate circumstances, be justified. The Insurance Company has argued 
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for the applicability of two of those subsections: 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(6). 
(Brief of Appellant at 12-17). In doing so, however, the Insurance Company 
has improperly attempted to graft the more liberal standards of a third 
subsection (Rule 60(b)(1)) onto the analysis for relief under Rules 60(b)(4) 
and (6). 
A. The Standard for Granting Relief Under Rule 60(b)(1) is Liberal, If the 
Motion is Filed Within the Rule's Strict Time Limits. 
Relief under Rule 60(b)(1) is predicated upon a showing of "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). Courts are 
liberal and indulgent in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(1), but only if the 
motion for relief is filed within the 3-month time period mandated in the rule, 
id. 
If a movant fails to file his motion for relief within the 3-month period, 
there is no liberality in favor of relief and no policy disfavoring the default 
judgment. In fact, Utah cases make it clear that a trial judge has no 
discretion to grant an untimely motion under Rule 60(b)(1). As the Utah 
Court of Appeals stated in Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 
382, 387: 
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In order for a party to be relieved from judgment under Rule 
60(b)(1), the party must demonstrate not only that the judgment 
resulted from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect, but also that the motion to set aside was timely, and 
that there exist issues worthy of adjudication, [cite omitted] In 
this case, Chipman filed his motion more than fifteen months 
after the entry of judgment, well outside the three-month time 
period provided by Rule 60(b)(1). Because Chipman's motion 
was not timely filed under Rule 60(b)(1), the trial court's 
dismissal of the motion was not an abuse of discretion. Indeed, 
the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion 
and would have erred had it done so. 
Richins, supra, 817 P.2d at 387 (emphasis added); accord, Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888, 889 (Utah 1976). 
Seen in this light, the cases cited on page 10 of the Brief of Appellant, 
emphasizing the policy of liberality in granting relief from default judgments, 
simply do not apply to the present case. Those cases feature fact situations 
where liberality and indulgence were appropriate because the motions were 
brought within the three-month time limit of Rule 60(b)(1). In those cases, 
the courts stressed the importance of timeliness. 
For example, in Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., 
611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), which is quoted at length on page 10 of the 
Brief of Appellant, the court addressed the timeliness requirement twice. 
The first t ime was in the following language omitted from the quote in the 
Brief of Appellant: 
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It is not to be questioned that in appropriate circumstances 
default judgments are justified; and when they are, they are 
invulnerable to attack. However, they are not favored in the law, 
especially where a party has timely responded with challenging 
pleadings. 
Interstate, supra, 611 P.2d at 371 (emphasis added). 
The second statement by the court in Interstate makes it clear that 
indulgence in setting aside default judgments is conditional upon timeliness in 
filing the motion: 
[T]he courts are generally indulgent toward the setting aside of 
default judgments where there is a reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and where timely 
application is made to set it aside. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
Other cases cited by the Insurance Company contain similar 
statements linking liberality in granting relief to timeliness in filing the motion 
for relief. For example, in Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986), the 
Court expressly conditioned indulgence in setting aside default judgments 
upon timeliness in seeking relief: 
The court should be generally indulgent toward setting a 
judgment aside where there is reasonable justification or excuse 
for the defendant's failure to answer and when timely application 
is made. 
Katz, supra, 732 P.2d at 93 (emphasis added); accord, Mavhew v. Standard 
Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 9 5 1 , 952 (Utah 1962); State of Utah v. Musselman. 
667 P.2d 1053, 1055-1056 (Utah 1983). 
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Although the expressions of liberality and indulgence set forth on page 
10 of the Brief of Appellant are significant where timely motion is made, they 
do not apply in the present case. The Insurance Company's Motion for 
Relief was filed more than 17 months after entry of Judgment, and the 
Insurance Company for that reason is not even seeking relief under Rule 
60(b)(1). 
As part of its argument for liberality, the Insurance Company argues for 
the first time on appeal that default judgments entered without notice may 
violate the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution (Utah Const., Art. 
I, Sec. 11). (Brief of Appellant at 1 1 , n. 4) This argument must be rejected 
for t w o reasons: first, because it was not raised in the court below, Pratt v. 
City Council of City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173 (Utah 1981); and 
second, because in the present case the Insurance Company unquestionably 
received legally sufficient notice. See Argument II below. 
B. The Standard for Granting Relief Under Rule 60(b)(4) Involves No 
Liberality and is Simply a Question of Law. 
A movant filing under Rule 60(b)(4) asserts as the ground for relief that 
the judgment is void. The determination of the validity of the judgment is a 
mixed question of fact and law. Whether the defendant was served is a 
question of fact. Carnes, supra, 668 P.2d at 557. Whether the service was 
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legally sufficient is a question of law. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290-
291 (Utah 1986). 
In deciding a motion under Rule 60(b)(4), there is no discretion and no 
liberality. If the judgment is void as a matter of law, relief will be granted. If 
the judgment is not void, relief will be denied. 
The standard under Rule 60(b)(4) was stated plainly by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the Garcia case: 
Rule 60(b)(4) ... authorizes relief from void judgments. 
Necessarily a motion under this part of the rule differs markedly 
from motions under the other clauses of Rule 60(b). There is no 
question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is 
under Rule 60(b)(4). ... Either a judgment is void or it is valid. 
Determining which may well present a difficult question, but 
when that question is resolved, the court must act accordingly. 
Garcia, supra, 712 P.2d at 290-291 (emphasis added), quoting wi th approval 
from Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, §2862. 
Thus, the decision whether to grant the Insurance Company's Motion 
for Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) does not involve "liberality" or "indulgence", 
but rather is a matter of determining whether or not the Judgment is void. 
As will be shown in Argument II below, the Judgment in the present 
case is not void, but instead is valid and enforceable. 
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C. The Standard for Granting Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6) is Selective and 
Prohibitive Rather Than Liberal or Indulgent. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established the following standard for 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6): 
Subdivision (7) [now (6)] is the residuary clause of rule 60(b); it 
embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other 
than those listed in subdivisions (1) through (6) [now (5)]; 
second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion 
be made within a reasonable time. 
Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Association, Inc., 657 P.2d 1304, 
1306-1307 (Utah 1982) (Emphasis in original); accord, Richins, supra, 817 
P.2d at 387. 
Courts provide no liberality or indulgence in connection wi th motions 
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The standard is restrictive and prohibitive: 
"Subsection (7) [now (6)] should be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by 
the Court only in unusual and exceptional circumstances." Laub, supra. 
The specific requirements and restrictive rules for granting relief under 
Rule 60(b)(6) are applied in default judgment cases as rigorously as in other 
cases, wi th no liberality or indulgence. For example, in Lincoln Benefit Life 
Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah 
App. 1992), default judgment was taken against a defendant on May 29, 
1990. 838 P.2d at 673. Six months later, on November 30, 1990, the 
defendant filed a motion for relief under subsection (7) [now (6)]. \cL at 674. 
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In the motion, he blamed the default judgment on his former attorney, 
claiming that the attorney had assured him that he would "take care of the 
matter." kL at 674. The trial court denied the motion. kL 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the reason for relief 
(negligence of the attorney) more properly fit within subsection (1) of Rule 
60(b), and since it was brought more than three months after judgment, it 
was untimely and denial of the motion was appropriate. kL at 674-675. 
There was no mention of liberality or indulgence; as soon as it was 
determined that the motion was untimely, it was denied. kL 
As will be shown in Argument III below, the Motion for Relief in the 
present case was also properly denied, because it did not satisfy any of the 
three requirements for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
II. 
DENIAL OF RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(4) 
WAS PROPER BECAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE 
BY A CONSTABLE ON A REGISTERED 
AGENT IS EFFECTIVE SERVICE AND 
NO OTHER SERVICE IS REQUIRED 
The Insurance Company argues for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), urging 
that the Judgment is void for lack of service. (Brief of Appellant at 12-14). 
The Insurance Company contends, first, that the Registered Agent was not 
served (kL at 5-6, 13), and alternatively, that the Insurance Company itself 
14 
did not receive actual notice of the Lawsuit (]dL at 5-6, 14). Neither 
argument is persuasive. 
A. The Constable Unquestionably Served the Registered Agent. 
The Constable's Affidavit and Return establish the following facts: 
that the Constable received a summons in the Lawsuit, specifically addressed 
to the Insurance Company; that he personally delivered that summons to the 
Registered Agent's office in Salt Lake City on January 18, 1996; that he 
handed the summons to Michelle Rehrman, an employee of the Registered 
Agent known to him by name and face; that he wrote her name on the 
return copy of the summons while in the Registered Agent's office; and that 
later the same day he prepared his Affidavit of Service, which he signed 
under oath. (Statement of Relevant Facts, above, par. 3-12, R. at 164-174). 
The rule is well established that "[t]he sheriff's return of service of 
process is presumptively correct and is prima facie evidence of the facts 
stated therein." Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah 1991) (emphasis 
added). 
Classic is not required to submit anything more than the evidence 
summarized above, in order to establish the validity of its Judgment. The 
burden of proof is upon the Insurance Company to overcome the Constable's 
affidavit and return. kL Furthermore, the return cannot be overcome by 
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anything less than clear and convincing evidence. Carnes v. Carnes, 668 
P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1983). 
The type of evidence needed to meet the "clear and convincing" 
standard has been discussed by the Florida Court of Appeals. In Slomowitz 
v. Walker, 429 So.2d 797 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1983), a default judgment was 
entered based on a deputy sheriff's return of service. 429 So.2d at 798. 
Some years later, the judgment debtor filed a motion to set the judgment 
aside, claiming she had not been served, id . 
The trial court set aside the judgment, based on evidence indicating 
that the process server no longer had a present recollection of service, the 
judgment debtor denied having been served, and another witness testified 
that the debtor never frequented the business location at which service had 
occurred. kL. 
On appeal, the Florida Court of Appeals began its analysis by defining 
the level of proof needed to overcome a return of service: 
Florida cases have consistently held that: To impeach the return 
of a sheriff, made under the sanction of official oath and 
responsibility, clear and convincing evidence is required. 
Id. at 799 (emphasis added). 
Having established the standard of proof-clear and convincing 
evidence-the Florida Court undertook to define the term and apply it to the 
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case then on appeal. In doing so, the court cited numerous cases which had 
discussed the meaning of the term, and concluded as fol lows: 
Our review of the foregoing cases convinces us that a workable 
definition of clear and convincing evidence must contain both 
qualitative and quantitative standards. We therefore hold that 
clear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be 
found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify 
must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise 
and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to 
the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it 
produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or 
conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations 
sought to be established. 
Slomowitz, supra, 429 So.2d at 800 (emphasis added). 
Under that standard, the Florida court ruled that the evidence relied on 
by the trial court in setting aside the judgment was insufficient, and therefore 
the court reversed the decision below, and upheld the default judgment. \jL 
The standard set forth in Slomowitz is consistent wi th Utah law: 
The Utah Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Wolfe, 
defined the type of evidence needed to be clear and convincing: 
That proof is convincing which carries wi th it, not only the 
power to persuade the mind as to the probable truth or 
correctness of the fact it purports to prove, but has the element 
of clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and convincing 
proof clinches what might be otherwise only probable to the 
mind ... But for a matter to be clear and convincing to a 
particular mind it must at least have reached the point where 
there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the 
correctness of the conclusion. 
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Bovette v. L.W. Loonev & Son, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 1344, 1347 (D. Utah 
1996) (emphasis added in Bovette 
) . 
In the present case, the Insurance Company has not even come close 
to the clear and convincing evidence needed to overcome the Constable's 
return. The only possible source of "precise and explicit" testimony capable 
of controverting the Constable's Return would have been Michelle Rehrman. 
She is the only other person with direct knowledge of what occurred when 
the summons and complaint were served. 
On July 8, 1997, a copy of the Constable's Return was mailed to the 
Insurance Company's counsel in Salt Lake City. (R. at 194). The 
Constable's Return identified Michelle Rehrman as the individual upon whom 
service was made. (R. at 171). 
From July 8, 1997, until the Court's Minute Entry of October 29, 
1997, denying the Motion for Relief, 113 days passed, or nearly 4 months. 
(R. at 219). The Insurance Company had nearly four months in which to 
locate Michelle Rehrman, obtain her testimony, and submit an affidavit 
disputing the Constable's Affidavit, if indeed it had been inaccurate. 
No such affidavit was ever submitted. Nor did the Insurance Company 
ever submit any pleadings to the court below indicating that Michelle 
Rehrman could not be located, was not at work on January 18, 1996, or 
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was not (as alleged by the Constable) an employee of the Registered Agent. 
Rather than submitting the potentially "credible", "distinctly 
remembered", and "precise and explicit" testimony of Michelle Rehrman, the 
Insurance Company relied upon the Affidavit of Sandy Streeper. (R. at 142-
147). Ms. Streeper's affidavit contained no evidence contradicting the 
Constable's Affidavit and Return. This is not surprising, since Ms. Streeper 
was not present when service was made. (Aff. of Constable, par. 1 1 , R. at 
166). She was not the employee served. (Id.) She had no personal 
knowledge as to whether or not service was made. Her only testimony was 
that she had searched the Registered Agent's computer database without 
being able to locate therein the appropriate entry acknowledging service of 
the summons on the Insurance Company in the Lawsuit. (Aff. of Streeper, 
par. 7, R. at 143). 
Lacking actual evidence to undercut the Constable's Return, the 
Insurance Company has resorted to speculation (Brief of Appellant at 5), as 
well as nitpicking and wishful thinking (kL at 6, note 3), in an attempt to 
create some doubt regarding the Constable's service. 
The Insurance Company has also raised at least one argument that 
cannot be considered on appeal because it was not presented to the court 
below: the argument, proposed initially on page 6, note 3 and later repeated 
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on pages 13 and 14 of the Brief of Appellant, that the Constable failed to 
note on his Return the time of day of service as required by U.C.A. §78-12a-
2(3). Utah's courts have consistently held that they will not consider on 
appeal an issue not reached or ruled on by the trial court. Broberg v. Hess, 
782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Constable's Return must be controverted by clear and convincing 
evidence. This means evidence that is not only "credible" and "precise and 
explicit", but also evidence that produces a firm belief, without hesitancy, as 
to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. Slomowitz, supra, 
429 So.2d at 800. The fact sought to be established by the Insurance 
Company was that the Constable did not serve summons and complaint on 
the Registered Agent. 
Viewing the evidence presented to it in light of the applicable legal 
standard, the district court's acceptance of the factual accuracy of the 
Constable's Return (R. at 219) was an appropriate exercise of its discretion; 
and its denial of the Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) was correct as a 
matter of law. Garcia, supra, 712 P.2d at 290-291 . 
B. It Was Not Necessary For Classic To Give Additional Notice of the 
Lawsuit. 
The Brief of Appellant emphasizes that the Insurance Company did not 
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receive "actual" notice of the Lawsuit. (Brief of Appellant at 8, 14) 
The Insurance Company is not an individual. It is a large corporation, 
acting on a national scale through many different agents and employees. Its 
principal office is, or was, in Chicago (R. at 138, 178), and it has regional 
offices at least in New York and Dallas. (R. at 112, 178). 
In Utah, the insurance company is a foreign corporation without any 
office or representative, so far as the record reflects, other than CT 
Corporation System, which has served as its Registered Agent at least since 
1990. (R. at 143, 178, 193). 
Every foreign corporation doing business in Utah is required to have 
and maintain a registered agent. Utah Code Ann., §16-10a-1508. Every 
such registered agent is authorized by statute to receive service of process: 
The registered agent of a foreign corporation authorized to 
transact business in this state is the foreign corporation's agent 
for service of process, demand, notice, or demand required or 
permitted by law to be served on the foreign corporation. 
Utah Code Ann. , §16-10a-1511(1) (emphasis added). 
Service on the Registered Agent bound the Insurance Company even if 
no other officers, employees or agents of the Insurance Company were 
aware of the service. U.R.C.P., Rule 4(e)(5). 
In Brown Grain & Livestock, Inc. v. Union Pacific Resource Company, 
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878 P.2d 157 (Colo. App. 1994), a plaintiff sued two defendants. Both 
defendants had designated the "Corporation Company" as their registered 
agent for service of process. Brown at 158. Plaintiff's process server 
served two summonses on the agent (the Corporation Company), which 
mistakenly forwarded both of them to only one of the two defendants. UL 
The other defendant (Union Pacific Resource Company) failed to answer the 
complaint and had default judgment entered against it. j d . When its motion 
to set aside the default judgment was denied, Union Pacific appealed. 
On appeal, the Colorado Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's 
denial of Union Pacific's motion to set aside the default judgment, holding as 
fol lows: 
When an agent acts within the scope of his or her authority, 
knowledge of the agent is knowledge of the principal. [Cite 
omitted]. Thus, if a defendant selects as its designated agent a 
company receiving service of process for numerous other 
entities, the defendant takes a risk that errors in transmittal by 
its agent, such as occurred here, will bind the principal. 
Brown, supra, 878 P.2d at 158 (emphasis added). 
When Classic filed its complaint and issued summons for service upon 
the Insurance Company, Classic was not required to identify, track down and 
serve the Insurance Company's president in Chicago, its General Counsel in 
Dallas, or any of hundreds or perhaps thousands of other possible officers, 
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agents, or employees of the Insurance Company, in order to effectuate 
service. Classic was simply required to serve a copy of the summons and 
complaint on the Insurance Company's Registered Agent in Utah. See 
U.C.A. §16-10a-1511 and U.R.C.P., Rule 4(e)(5). Service by the Constable 
on the Registered Agent was proper, sufficient and complete. Based on that 
service, the Judgment was valid, no further notice was required, and the 
court below correctly denied the Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b)(4). 
III. 
DENIAL OF RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(6) 
WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY FAILED TO SATISFY ANY OF 
THE THREE PREREQUISITES TO RELIEF 
As noted above, Utah case law has defined three requirements for 
granting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6): first, that the reason for 
relief be one other than those listed in subdivisions (1) through (5) of the 
Rule; second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion be 
made within a reasonable time. Laub, supra, 657 P.2d at 1306-1307. 
The Insurance Company cannot satisfy any of the three requirements. 
A. The Reason for Relief Has Also Been Asserted Under Rule 60(b)(4) and 
Therefore Cannot be Asserted Under Rule 60(b)(6). 
The Insurance Company's sole expressed reason for relief is its claim 
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of invalid service. (Brief of Appellant at 12) As discussed above, this claim 
fits under Rule 60(b)(4) and for that reason cannot be used as a basis for 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Laub, supra. 
B. The Reason Does Not Justify Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6). 
As shown above, the Insurance Company is not entitled to relief from 
judgment on the grounds of invalid service, either under Rule 60(b)(4) or 
under Rule 60(b)(6), because the service was proper and effective. 
C. The Motion for Relief Was Not Brought Within a "Reasonable Time" as 
Required Under Rule 60(b)(6). 
The third element which must be demonstrated for relief under 
Subsection (6) is that the motion for relief be filed within a reasonable time. 
Laub, supra, 657 P.2d 1306-1307. In this case, Notice of Entry of 
Judgment (hereinafter "Notice") was mailed to the Registered Agent on 
March 1 1 , 1997. (Aff. of Schmutz, par. 9). Included in the Notice was a 
copy of the Judgment itself. (Id.) It is undisputed that the Insurance 
Company's registered agent received the Notice and Judgment on March 13, 
1996, nearly seventeen months before the motion was filed. (Aff. of 
Streeper, par. 10, R. at 144). 
Even if the Registered Agent had not been served wi th summons and 
complaint (which it was) the receipt by the Registered Agent of the Notice 
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and Judgment provided actual notice to the agent, and therefore to the 
Insurance Company, that the Judgment had been entered. It was incumbent 
upon the Insurance Company, if it believed it had grounds for setting aside 
the Judgment, to act quickly, and certainly within a reasonable t ime, to seek 
relief from that Judgment. 
A reasonable time for filing the motion in this case would have been 
the three-month period established in Rule 60(b), since most of that initial 
three-month period was still available to the Insurance Company as of March 
13, 1996. Seventeen months was not a reasonable time to wait before filing 
the motion. 
In the Laub case, a delay of six months before filing a motion to set 
aside a judgment was considered unreasonable for purposes of Subsection 
(7) [now (6)]. Laub, supra, 657 P.2d at 1307. And in Matter of Estate of 
Pepper, 711 P.2d 2 6 1 , 264 (Utah 1985), nine months was considered too 
long a t ime. 
In Workman v. Naqle Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 
1990), a defendant against whom judgment had been entered filed a motion 
to set the judgment aside. Workman at 750. In the motion, the defendant 
claimed that the judgment entered against her was void because the plaintiff 
had failed to send her notice of entry of the judgment as required in U.R.C.P. 
25 
58A(d). Jd,. 
On appeal after denial of the defendant's motion, the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that failure to send notice as required in Rule 58A(d) did not 
make the judgment void or affect its enforceability. kL at 7 5 1 . The Court of 
Appeals also held, however, that a judgment debtor's inaction, after receipt 
of a notice under Rule 58A(d), would affect a court's determination as to 
whether a motion to set the judgment aside was filed within a reasonable 
time under Subsection (6): 
If a party has had notice of the judgment but has nevertheless 
remained idle in attacking it in the court of rendition or in 
appealing it, that lack of diligence is a strong reason not to 
disturb the judgment-
Workman, supra, 802 P.2d at 751 (emphasis added). 
In an attempt to persuade this Court that its Motion for Relief was filed 
within a reasonable t ime, despite its Agent's admitted receipt of notice more 
than 17 months earlier, the Insurance Company has made three arguments, 
two of which were not presented to the court below. All three arguments 
are factually inaccurate and legally insupportable. 
1. Under Rule 58A(d), Classic was required to serve the Notice, 
not on the Registered Agent (who was the agent for service of 
' process only), but directly on the Insurance Company. 
This argument was made for the first time on pages 6, 8-9, and 20-21 
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of the Brief of Appellant. The argument was not presented to the court 
below (see R. at 101-147, 199-214) and for that reason cannot be 
considered on appeal. Broberq v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 
1989). 
In any event, the argument is legally insupportable. Utah Code Ann. , 
§16-10a-1511, which defines the scope of the Registered Agent's 
competence, makes it clear that the Agent is appointed not only for receipt 
of service of process, but for "service of process, notice or demand required 
or permitted by law to be served on the foreign corporation." U.C.A.§16-
10a-1511 (1) (emphasis added). 
Because the Registered Agent was, under the statute, authorized to 
received the Notice on behalf of the Insurance Company, mailing the Notice 
to the Registered Agent was appropriate under Rule 5(b)(1). 
2. The Notice was defective, because the envelope in which 
Classic sent the Notice did not identify the Insurance Company, 
so the Registered Agent returned the Notice to Classic's attorney 
wi th a request for additional information, which was never 
provided. 
This argument, which was made to the court below (R. at 205-206), is 
misleading and irrelevant. The argument is misleading because it attempts to 
focus attention on the envelope rather than on the Notice. It is true that the 
address on the outside of the envelope did not identify the Insurance 
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Company. (R. at 192) But that did not cause any difficulties for the 
Registered Agent at the time. 
Ms. Streeper's letter, which accompanied the Notice returned to 
Classic's attorney, said nothing about the envelope. Instead, it stated the 
fol lowing: 
On March 13, 1996, CT Corporation System ("CT") received, by 
Regular Mail a Notice of entry of default judgment in the above 
entitled action. The documents failed to note which party is 
being served, therefor we are unable to forward the documents 
to the proper party. 
R. at 187 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in her Affidavit, Ms. Streeper said nothing about the 
envelope, but instead acknowledged, again, that she had received the 
Notice, and for some unknown reason concluded that it was not addressed 
to a particular corporate entity. (Aff. of Streeper, par. 10 -11 , R. at 144). 
It was not the envelope which confused Ms. Streeper; it was the 
Notice itself. It is difficult to understand the source of her confusion, since 
the Notice identified the Insurance Company as the affected party more than 
once and in no uncertain terms. (See Statement of Relevant Facts, par. 16, 
page 6 above). 
The additional information requested by Ms. Streeper was the "full 
name" of the corporation. Since the full name of the Insurance Company 
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was already on the Notice, and on the Judgment, no further information was 
required. The Notice was valid as sent. 
3. Classic deliberately and intentionally concealed the Judgment 
from the Insurance Company by not sending the Notice directly 
to the Insurance Company. 
This argument was made for the first time on pages 8-9, 17, 19, 20 
and 21 of the Brief of Appellant. The argument was not presented to the 
court below (see R. at 101-147, 199-214) and for that reason cannot be 
considered on appeal. Broberq v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 
1989). 
In any event, the argument is factually misleading and legally 
irrelevant. The argument is misleading because it implies the Insurance 
Company was fully responsive to Classic, that Classic knew its claims 
against the Insurance Company were insupportable and intentionally tried to 
get a default judgment against the Insurance Company. This is simply not 
true. 
It was the Insurance Company, not Classic, which broke off 
communications and refused to provide information prior to litigation. 
Following Classic's initial letter (R. at 138-139) and the Insurance 
Company's initial response (R. at 140), Classic's attorney sent a letter to the 
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Insurance Company, requesting information and documents relating to 
Classic's claims and the Insurance Company's defenses. (R. at 180). The 
Insurance Company ignored the request, never responded to the letter, and 
never provided any information or documents. (Aff. of Schmutz, par. 6, R. 
at 176, 180). 
Classic waited more than a year for a response from the Insurance 
Company before filing suit. When the Insurance Company never responded, 
Classic had no realistic choice but to file suit. When Classic did file suit, and 
when it obtained the Judgment, Classic had no information tending to 
establish any defenses to its claims. The Insurance Company did not 
respond to Classic when Classic informally requested documents. It was 
only when Classic was collecting a Judgment that the Insurance Company 
belatedly attempted to address the merits of the claims against it. By that 
t ime, however, the Judgment was more than 17 months old and the merit 
were moot. See Cox, supra, 384 P.2d at 808. 
IV. 
THE MERITS OF THE UNDERLYING JUDGMENT 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL 
FROM THE MOTION FOR RELIEF 
The Insurance Company has submitted information both to the court 
below and to this Court regarding the merits of its claimed defenses. (Aff. of 
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Dewbre, par. 5-15, R. at 112-114; Brief of Appellant at 4-5, 21-22). 
The court below properly declined to consider the Insurance 
Company's claimed defenses. (R. at 219, 161-162). It is inappropriate as a 
matter of law to consider the merits of any claimed defense on a motion to 
set aside a judgment, unless and until the movant proves entitlement to relief 
under one of the subsections of Rule 60(b). In Board of Education of Granite 
School District v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963), the Court stated: 
Appellant in asserting the Statute of Frauds and lack of 
consideration has set forth defenses which apply to the merits of 
the case and have no application as to why appellant did not 
answer within the time allotted. We are concerned only wi th 
why he did not answer, not wi th what kind of answer would he 
give if he were so inclined. This latter question arises only after 
consideration of the first question and a sufficient excuse 
therefrom being shown. 
Board of Education, supra, 384 P.2d at 808 (emphasis added). 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court reinforced the Cox rule in 
these words: 
This Court's statement in the Cox decision (quoted immediately 
above) clearly sets forth the policy in this jurisdiction requiring 
that the lower court consider and resolve the question of 
excusable neglect (when the motion to vacate the default 
judgment is based on excusable neglect ) prior to its 
consideration of the issue of whether a meritorious defense 
exists. Furthermore, in accordance wi th this policy, it is 
unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate, to even consider the 
issue of meritorious defenses unless the court is satisfied that a 
sufficient excuse has been shown. 
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State of Utah v. Musselman, supra, 667 P.2d at 1056 (emphasis added). 
On appeal from the district court's denial of the Motion for Relief, the 
merits of claimed defenses to the underlying Judgment should not be 
reviewed. As the Idaho Court of Appeals recently observed: 
It has been held that a Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for a 
timely appeal, [cites omitted] ... However persuasive the 
[appellant's] assertions of legal error might have been on a direct 
appeal, timely taken, our review of the [appellant's] appeal in its 
present procedural posture is strictly limited to determining 
whether the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion 
constituted an abuse of discretion. ... [W]e can only consider 
whether the denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion; we 
cannot reach the merits of the underlying judgment. 
Ade v. Batten, 878 P.2d 813, 815-816 (Idaho App. 1994) (emphasis added). 
V. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REMAND 
FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
The Insurance Company asks this Court to remand to the district court 
for an evidentiary hearing on the sufficiency of notice. (Brief of Appellant at 
14 n. 5). There are three reasons, each one sufficient alone, for this Court 
not to remand for an evidentiary hearing. 
A. There Is No Substantial Dispute Regarding The Sufficiency Of Service. 
As pointed out in Argument II above, the testimony of the Constable is 
clear, detailed, direct and consistent, and establishes all the necessary 
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factual elements of sufficient service. In marked contrast, the Insurance 
Company submitted no evidence to the district court, other than the 
Registered Agent's inability to confirm that a record of the service was 
entered into its computer files. (Aff. of Streeper, par. 7, R. at 143). 
The Insurance Company's evidence was too weak, indirect and 
minimal to rise to a level anywhere near the "clear and convincing" evidence 
needed to overcome the Constable's Return. Carnes, supra, 668 P.2d at 
557. 
This case is factually distinguishable from the cases cited by the 
Insurance Company in support of its request for remand. For example, in 
Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907 (2d. Cir. 1983), the Court relied heavily upon 
the specific facts of the case in coming to the conclusion that remand was 
necessary: 
Standing alone, the weasel-worded affidavit submitted by Musler 
in the instant action might not be sufficient to support 
defendants' position. But we cannot overlook that both 
defendants did assert in identical unequivocal language in 
affidavits submitted in the supplementary proceedings "That on 
June 3, 1 9 8 1 , I was not at home all day, as I was out on 
personal errands, shopping, etc." 
Davis, supra, 713 F.2d at 914 (emphasis added). 
The court in Davis pointed out another fact unique to that case which 
caused it to believe an evidentiary hearing was necessary: that a state court 
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in Florida had quashed the subpoenas served at the same time as summons 
and complaint, creating an inference that service was improper. IdL 
The unusual circumstances in the Davis case, which compelled the 
court there to conclude that an evidentiary hearing was required, do not exist 
in the present case. Because the Insurance Company's evidence fell so far 
short of the level required to challenge the Constable's Return, no evidentiary 
hearing was required. The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing before determining that service of process 
occurred and was sufficient. 
B. Motion Practice in Utah Does Not Contemplate Evidentiary Hearings 
Under Rule 60(b). 
Rule 60(b) is actuated by motion: 
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be 
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
U.R.C.P. 60(b) (emphasis added). 
Motion practice in Utah does not contemplate evidentiary hearings. 
There is no provision in the Utah rules or statutes establishing a right or 
necessity to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to determination of a 
motion under Rule 60(b). 
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In contrast, in an "independent action", which is an alternative method 
for seeking relief from a judgment, an evidentiary hearing, or trial, would 
have been the natural culmination of the action unless appropriately 
concluded sooner by summary judgment. 
The Insurance Company chose to seek relief by motion rather than by 
an independent action, and in so doing relinquished the right to have their 
allegations regarding the sufficiency of service aired in an evidentiary 
hearing. 
In similar circumstances, the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that a trial 
judge's refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing was not abuse of 
discretion. In State ex rel. Frohnmaver v. Low, 804 P.2d 1217 (Or. App. 
1991), service was made on the defendant by delivering summons and 
complaint to his wife at an address in California. kL at 1218. About eight 
months after default judgment was entered for non-appearance, the 
defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment. kL Both parties 
submitted affidavits on the issue of the sufficiency of service. kL at 1219. 
At a hearing on the motion to set aside the judgment, the defendant 
requested an opportunity to present oral testimony. kL The request was 
denied. ]dL The trial judge decided the issue of service on the affidavits and 
oral argument. jdL 
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On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals held as follows: 
In the absence of a statutory right to give oral testimony, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request. 
Frohnmaver, supra, 804 P.2d at 1219-1220. 
The Court in Frohnmaver went on to note that the evidence submitted 
by affidavit was conflicting as to whether the California address was the 
defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode. kL. at 1220. After 
reviewing the conflicting evidence, the Court concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion: 
Under those facts, the trial court did not err when it held that 
substituted service properly occurred at defendant's usual place 
of abode, [cite omitted] Therefore, service is presumed to be 
reasonably calculated to apprise defendant of the action and to 
afford him a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend. 
Nothing in the record overcomes the presumption and the default 
judgment is not void. 
\_± at 1220 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, although Judge Noel did not order an evidentiary 
hearing, he did carefully consider all the affidavits and briefs submitted by 
both parties and, based upon the facts set forth therein, concluded that the 
Judgment was valid and the Motion for Relief should be denied. (See Order 
Denying All American's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, R. at 229-
230). 
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Since the Insurance Company elected to proceed by motion, a 
procedure which did not contemplate an evidentiary hearing, and since there 
was nothing in the evidence submitted by the Insurance Company's 
affidavits to overcome the presumption in favor of the Constable's Return, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Motion for Relief 
without an evidentiary hearing. 
C. The Insurance Company Failed to Request a Hearing or Object to the 
Lack of a Hearing. 
Utah's rules provide a means for requesting a hearing on any motion. 
(See Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 (3)). If the Insurance 
Company desired to cross-examine the Constable, or produce Michelle 
Rehrman as a live witness, or believed for any other reason that an 
evidentiary hearing was necessary or appropriate, it could have requested 
such a hearing. See Reed v. Reed, supra, 806 P.2d at 1185, where an 
evidentiary hearing was conducted, at defendant's request, on the issue of 
sufficiency of service. In the present case, the Insurance Company never 
requested a hearing. (Order, page 2, R. at 230). 
Utah's appellate courts have stated repeatedly that they will not 
consider claimed errors related to evidence, or the lack thereof, for the first 
time on appeal. For example, in Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 
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1980), the trial court admitted a summary of testimony into evidence. \jL at 
494. 
On appeal from an adverse judgment, the defendants in Condas argued 
for the first time that the proponent of the summary had not proven that the 
witnesses were unavailable for trial as a precondition to the admissibility of 
the summary. kL at 495. The Utah Supreme Court refused to consider this 
issue, noting as fol lows: 
Had defendants objected to this representation, plaintiffs would 
have had an opportunity to produce evidence that these 
witnesses were unavailable. Defects curable at trial cannot be 
relied upon by a party if the trial court has had no opportunity to 
rule thereon. 
Condas, supra, 618 P.2d at 495, n. 8 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in the case of LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189 
(Utah App. 1991), the trial court entered summary judgment on the issue of 
liability and then instructed the parties to submit affidavits on the damages 
issue. |dL at 192. After reviewing the affidavits, the trial court granted 
judgment in an amount certain based on the affidavits. IdL 
On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial judge had deprived 
them of their constitutional right to trial by deciding the damages issue on 
the affidavits rather than at trial. kL at 197. The Court of Appeals refused 
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to consider the argument: 
We do not reach the merits of this argument because it was not 
adequately preserved for appeal by a timely objection during the 
trial proceedings. It is axiomatic that matters not presented to 
the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
LMV Leasing, supra, 805 P.2d at 197 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, even if it had been appropriate to hold an 
evidentiary hearing in the district court, the Insurance Company's failure to 
request a hearing at the trial level prevents it from requesting remand for an 
evidentiary hearing now. 
VI. 
THE ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED IN THE 
JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED 
ON APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF A MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM THE JUDGMENT 
The Insurance Company argues for the first time on appeal that the 
attorneys fees awarded in the Judgment were inappropriate. (Brief of 
Appellant at 23-24). The relief sought by the Insurance Company is for the 
"award" to be "reversed". kJL 
The argument was not made to the court below. In the Insurance 
Company's opening brief in the district court, at page 6, the argument was 
made that the Judgment should be set aside because the Insurance 
Company had not yet had an opportunity to dispute the merits of Classic's 
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claim, including its claim to attorneys fees (R. at 106). However, no 
argument was made that the attorneys fees should be set aside. The only 
argument made was that the Insurance Company should have relief from the 
Judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) in order to dispute the validity of the claims, 
including the claim to fees. kL 
It is an entirely different argument to urge, as the Insurance Company 
does for the first time on appeal, that the attorneys fees portion of the 
Judgment should be "reversed", and, presumably, removed from the 
Judgment. 
Having failed to make the argument below, the Insurance Company 
cannot make it for the first time on appeal. 
Even if the argument had been made below, it is misplaced. A motion 
under Rule 60(b) does not reach the merits of the case, and an appeal from 
denial of such a motion brings up only the denial of the motion and not the 
merits of the underlying judgment itself. Ade, supra, 878 P.2d at 815-816. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Classic requests the Court to enter its 
order affirming the district court's Order Denying All American's Motion to 
Set Aside Default Judgment. 
DATED this of July, 1998. 
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